

Russian Proposals for a New Security Architecture In Europe

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ABSTRACT

The paper will analyse Russia's proposals for new security architecture in Europe. It assesses the demands of the Russian side. The main assumption of the paper is that the European security architecture of 20th century has gradually died. Based on this knowledge, Russia came up with proposals how to redefine it. But the "collective West" seems to be unable to participate due to a sense of neo-colonial superiority and arrogance. It blindly insists on the status quo of the Cold War which prevents EU countries from working to establish a real common security policy independent of the US foreign policy.

Key words: security proposals, Russia, USA, negotiations, security architecture

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I. Background

In the late 1980s, the Copenhagen School of Security Studies, represented by analysts **O. Waever** and **B. Buzan**, came up with the definition of security as an indivisible phenomenon consisting of several dimensions. Based on this concept, a new European security architecture² began to be built in the early 1990s founded on the principle of security indivisibility, which combines the security of one state with the security of others, while respecting the principle that no state strengthens its security at the expense of the security of others; and on the principle of equal security for all states, regardless of their size, military, economic or other potential (Brhlíková, 2014, p. 48). Its backbone became the Paris Charter for New Europe of 21 November 1990, in which all European states, as well as the Soviet Union, the United States and Canada agreed on the indivisibility of security and that it was impossible to strengthen security at the expense of each other, and that the creation of any exclusive military blocs that encourage arms escalation and confrontation is considered to be overcome and dangerous in an atmosphere of international tensions³. Subsequently, this concept was confirmed by the Istanbul Document in Part II, paragraphs 7 and 8 of 19 November 1999 (Istanbul document, 1999), and paragraph 3 of the Astana Declaration of 3 December 2010 (Astana Commemorative Declaration: Towards a Security Community, 2010).

However, further developments have led to breach of this principle. First, the US deviated from the principles of the Paris Charter when it began to push for NATO enlargement deep into Eastern Europe⁴, violating promises made to CPSU Secretary General **M. Gorbachev** (i.e. Russia) in exchange for German unification that NATO would never expand⁵, which **G. Kennan**⁶ commented: "Overall, NATO enlargement would be the most fatal

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² In 1989, not only did the bipolar world disappear, but with the unification of Germany the Yalta Agreement of 1945 ceased to apply, and the old security architecture in Europe disintegrated.

³ The charter was signed at the CSCE summit in Paris by such personalities as **M. Gorbachev**, **G. Bush Sr.**, **H. Kohl**, **F. Mitterrand**, **M. Thatcher**, **V. Havel** and **L. Wales**. The summit marked the end of the Cold War and heralded the transformation of the CSCE format into a permanent international security organization uniting the northern hemisphere from Vancouver to Vladivostok. After the collapse of the USSR, the United States made great efforts to forget the Charter in the European environment as soon as possible. However, the Russian side does not stop referring to it, as well as to documents received later, and invokes its application.

⁴ Since 1991, accession negotiations with the countries of the then Visegrad Troika have begun. In 1999, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic became formal members of NATO.

⁵ The phrase of **J. Baker**, the US Secretary of State "not one inch eastward" is well known. Not once, but three times, **Baker** used the phrase in an interview with **Gorbachev** at a meeting held on February 9, 1990 in Moscow. He agreed with **Gorbachev's** statement that "NATO expansion is unacceptable." **Baker** assured

mistake of American policy in the entire era since the end of the Cold War. Such a decision can be expected to dispel nationalist, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian public opinion; will have an adverse effect on the development of Russian democracy; it will renew the atmosphere of the Cold War in East-West relations and push Russia's foreign policy in a direction we will definitely not like... ” (Kennan, 1997)

This was followed by the bombing of Yugoslavia by NATO aircraft in 1999 without authorization by the UN Security Council; two waves of NATO enlargement to the east in 1999 and 2004; NATO's refusal to ratify the revised version of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)⁷; the unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the Anti-Ballistic Missile System Restriction Treaty, also known as the Missile Defence Treaty (ABM Treaty), in 2002; the Bush administration's decision to nominate Georgia and Ukraine for NATO membership at the Bucharest Summit in 2008, despite strong Russian warnings⁸ and the rejection of such enlargement by some NATO members (France and Germany)⁹; the overthrow of the democratically elected Ukrainian president in February 2014; the unilateral withdrawal of the US from the hard-

Gorbachev that “neither the president nor I intend to reap unilateral benefits from the ongoing trials”, and that Americans understand that “not only for the Soviet Union but also for other European countries, it is important to have guarantees that if the United States will maintain their presence in Germany within NATO, the NATO will not extend an inch eastwards.” (National Security Archive, 2022b). As archival records of National Security Archive further revealed, this **Baker's** commitment and guarantee, other US and European officials have reaffirmed: British Secretary of State **D. Hurd**, French President **F. Mitterrand**, US President **G.W. Bush Sr.**, and German Secretary of State **H.-D. Genscher**, German Chancellor **H. Kohl**, as well as NATO Secretary General M. Wörner.

⁶ Many important Western political figures agreed with his opinion – e.g. **R. McNamara**, former US Secretary of Defence; **P. H. Nitz**, Deputy Minister of Defence; **J. F. Matlock Jr.**, US Ambassador to the Soviet Union, a specialist in Soviet affairs, and others – in June 1997, in an open letter to President **B. Clinton**, they described the expansion of the alliance as a “political mistake of historical conditions”. They literally wrote: „We, the undersigned, believe that the current U.S. led effort to expand NATO, the focus of the recent Helsinki and Paris Summits, is a policy error of historic proportions. We believe that NATO expansion will decrease allied security and unsettle European stability...” (Arms Control Association, 2022)

⁷ The Conventional Armed Forces Treaty was signed in 1990 by sixteen NATO members and six Warsaw Pact members, and set the same limits for each bloc in five major categories of conventional armaments and military equipment, including tanks, armoured vehicles, artillery, attack helicopters and combat aircraft. A revised version was adopted at the OSCE summit in Istanbul in 1999 and was due to be ratified by all participating states. To date, it has only been ratified by Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Russia, which withdrew in 2014 because, in his view, NATO member countries have circumvented its provisions by enlarging NATO and have not yet ratified this amended version of the Treaty.

⁸ On February 12, 2022, WikiLeaks published transcripts of talks between Russian and American officials before the NATO summit in Bucharest on its Facebook page, where it can be read that former Russian Prime Minister **J. Primakov** warned the US Ambassador to Moscow **W. J. Burns** (now CIA Director) that Ukraine's invitation to NATO will infuriate the Russians and jeopardize the US-Russia strategic cooperation in many areas. **Primakov** literally threatened to question whether the Russian Federation would respect the border agreement with Ukraine in such a case, and explicitly mentioned the possibility of “revising the status of Crimea”. He emphasized the key thing: that Russia would never return to the 1990s era and it would be a “colossal mistake” to think that today's Russian reactions would reflect those of its strategic weakness. “Russia has its own state interests and will defend them”, **Primakov** warned his American colleague, who sent a telegram directly to Washington with this information. In the same vein, Foreign Minister **S. Lavrov** said in a letter to **Burns** requesting an assessment of Ukraine's membership in NATO that Russia would react in a completely different way than with the inclusion of Central European countries, Ukraine is an “emotional and neuralgic problem”. He expressed concern that such a decision could lead not only to violence but also to civil war in Ukraine. This will force a decision on whether or not Moscow will intervene because of Russia's large minority. According to **Burns**, **Lavrov** considers the division of spheres of influence to be anachronistic and recognizes Europe's legitimate interests in the region, but warned that all this must not happen regardless of the interests and security of its neighbours (WikiLeaks, 2022). Just a note, no European state has the right to be a member of NATO, no article in the North Atlantic Treaty grants such a right to anyone. The Member States are the ones who decide who to invite. And this invitation (since today it was just the countries of Eastern Europe) has been quietly consulted with Russia, at least until now.

⁹ Former US National Security Council member **F. Hill** revealed that the US intelligence community was opposed to the move, but then-President **G. W. Bush Jr** ignored her objections for reasons that were never fully explained (Erlanger, 2021). The result is an unpleasant compromise brokered by British officials, when NATO declared that both states would eventually join, but did not say when.

won agreement to limit Iran's nuclear program between Iran, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the EU, China, Russia and the US, officially called The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in May 2018; further from the Treaty on the Prohibition of Medium- and Short-Range Missiles in 2019 or from the Open Skies Agreement in 2020¹⁰. The US have undertaken military aggressions against the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria, contrary to international law and without the mandate of the UN Security Council, together with NATO or some of its willing members. All these activities were covered by empty, content-based slogans and talks about the spread of democracy, the protection of human rights, humanity and the establishment of justice and the rule of law, but behind such words was always the same old British *divide and rule* strategy, accompanied by irrational expansion without strategic resentment and arrogance of a colonial conqueror, because, as **O. Krejčí** (2022) said, the West became the West by conquest, not reason. Recently, NATO, especially after the Eastern enlargement, has only turned into a pendant of US foreign policy; it behaves instinctively, acting without rational strategic foresight in the sense of *I see the space, so I occupy it*. (Krejčí, 2022) It exists to justify the presence of the US and its military bases in Europe. It has been looking for its specific enemy since 1989 and found it, and thus its justification, after the speech of General **J. F. Dunford, Jr.** in front of the US Senate Committee on the occasion of him taking over the position of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the US Army, where he said that the biggest threat to the US is Russia. (Rosenberg, 2015) The two NATO Secretaries General, **A. F. Rasmussen** and **J. Stoltenberg**, repeated these words in their statements after him.

Of course, these activities subsequently provoked Russian responses, which, however, the so-called *collective West* does not accept the best and, in its intoxication and blindness from apparent domination, does not listen to and arrogantly ignores rational arguments. Let us just recall a speech by **V. Putin** (2007) at the Munich Security Conference in 2007, which warned against the overuse of military force in international relations, pointing out that *"countries where the death penalty is banned even against murderers and other criminals ... are very easily involved in military actions that are difficult to legitimize"*; that the cult of social Darwinism is too often hidden behind the beautiful words about human rights. He openly criticized the unipolarism in which the US made themselves a world policeman and which is unacceptable in today's world. He criticized the US for failing to respect international law; he criticized unbridled armaments, plans to create a US anti-missile umbrella, and efforts to strengthen NATO in Afghanistan. He quoted a statement from NATO Secretary General **M. Wörner** on 17 May 1990, who said: *"The fact that we are ready not to deploy NATO troops outside Germany gives the Soviet Union a firm guarantee of security."* And **Putin** asked: *"Where are these guarantees?"* (Putin, 2007) At the same time, however, he did not stop proposing cooperation, dialogue, elaboration of concrete agreements that take into account the interests of Russia, and he did not stop calling Western representatives partners (Putin 2007). However, he remained unheard with understanding. Journalists, diplomats and Western politicians have called the speech assertive; the most aggressive to date, a speech of an agent re-evoking the spirit of the Cold War. Russia was given the label of an assertive state. (Krejčí, 2022)

On this basis, Russia understood that soft power and appeasement in international politics, and tolerating the disruption of its national interests did not work. It is perceived as a weakness¹¹, as a challenge to predatory practices, as a challenge to ignore and disrespect the interests and position of the partner in space. Russia rejected the offered position of subordination, leaving it out of the order created by the West. Today, therefore, it faces the fact that Russia has a US base or fleet and US military allies on each of its outer spikes of classical geopolitical vectors. In addition, some states have emerged in the post-Soviet space, albeit with a common past but hostile to present-day Russia; at the same time Russia must face hybrid wars and attempts at colour revolutions. After a period of stagnation, Russia managed to restore the balance in the field of strategic weapons, as well as to proceed to the modernization of armaments and the organisation of troops to meet current requirements. Ensuring information, as well as economic sovereignty¹² has become a starting point for it. Since 2014, it is said that it has managed to restore the ability to carry out a second nuclear strike, i.e. to create a strategic balance with the US. (Krejčí, 2017, pp. 22-27; 505-507)

2 Russian proposals for "new" security architecture

Relations between Russia and the collective West have long been marked by a lack of trust. The escalation of tensions and the Western mainstream media's regular announcements about Russia's impending attack on

¹⁰ The Open Skies Treaty entered into force in 2002 and is seen as an important tool for international arms control. It allows one country's army to conduct a number of unarmed reconnaissance flights over another country. It has been signed by 35 countries around the world.

¹¹ There is a decline in the position (power) of such a state on the international scene compared to the growing position (growing power and military power) of other states, and thus also there is an increase the danger or reduction of its own security (Ivančík, 2022, p. 48).

¹² It was set up under the tide of sanctions of the so-called collective West after 2014.

eastern Ukraine, which resulted in massing of the world public towards a war, led Moscow to submit proposals to the US and NATO in mid-December 2021 in order to reorganise their relations. Recalling that since the NATO Summit in Brussels in 2018, the West has continued the line of Russia's military-political detention, relocating and forming troops near Russia's borders, consistently strengthening the military presence and intensifying the development of NATO's military infrastructure and exercises immediately on Russia's borders, while more and more NATO and US military contingents, personnel and heavy equipment are being relocated to them, and the neutral countries of Sweden and Finland are increasingly being drawn into these activities; Moscow notes that this is gradually and systematically destroying the functioning European security architecture, international law and new arms races are being launched. Russia does not want to engage in a forced and senseless confrontation, and, therefore, since there is no real alternative to a mutually beneficial and broad pan-European security cooperation on a solid foundation of international law, it has put forward proposals for firm agreements on future US-NATO relations that "*should depend on the Alliance's reciprocal readiness to take into account Russia's legitimate interests*"¹³ (MID, 2021a)

There are two proposals submitted by the Russian side. The first should regulate relations between Russia and the US, and the second should regulate relations between Russia and NATO. Russia even daring to submit them provoked a storm of outrage in the West¹⁴. They are labelled with the word ultimatum and a priori are described as unacceptable. In an article for Foreign Affairs magazine **A. Stent** (2022) called them Putin's doctrine. But what is the content of these agreements?

1. *Agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Safeguards* – Proposal: referring to the fundamental principles of international law¹⁵ as well as the UN Charter and its Declaration of Principles on International Law of 1970, Helsinki Final Act of 1975, Manila Agreement on Security and cooperation in Europe, the 1982 Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes, the Charter of European Security, Russia proposes to the US to cooperate on the basis of the principles of indivisible and equal security, so as not to affect actions or activities that could affect the security of the other Party and will not take measures, alone or through international organizations, military alliances or coalitions, that would harm the other Party's essential security interests. (MID, Article 1, 2021b) In Articles 2 and 3, the Parties are to commit that all international organizations, military alliances and coalitions of which they are members respect the principles of the UN Charter and do not use the territory of other States to prepare or carry out an armed attack or other action against on the other. Article 4 requires the US to commit not to further expand NATO to the east or accept former allied states into the Alliance; not to establish military bases in the territory of former non-NATO members of the USSR, use their infrastructure to conduct any military activities and develop bilateral military cooperation with them. Article 5 obliges both Parties not to deploy their forces and armaments in areas that the other Party may perceive as a threat to their national security, including deployment within an international organization, military alliance or coalition. They shall also refrain from heavy bombers equipped with nuclear or non-nuclear weapons and surface warships of all classes, including alliance ships, coalitions and organizations, in areas outside their national airspace or national territorial waters from which they could hit each other's targets. The two sides are to maintain dialogue and cooperation in order to improve the mechanisms for preventing dangerous military activities on the high seas and in the airspace. Articles 6 and 7 deal with the deployment of missiles and nuclear weapons, where the Parties commit not to deploy short- and medium-range missiles outside their national territory, as well as in areas within their own territories from which such weapons would be able to hit targets in the other Party's territory. They will not even deploy nuclear weapons outside their territory and, if such weapons were already deployed before this agreement was adopted, they will withdraw them. They will also remove all infrastructures to deploy such weapons outside their territory. They also commit not to train military personnel or civilians from countries that

¹³ Russia relies here on a strategic alignment of objectives with all the states and organisations in the Euro-Atlantic area in maintaining peace and stability, in the fight against common security threats such as international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, drug trafficking and piracy. This should be the basis for developing relations with NATO on the ground of equality of partners. (MID, 2021b)

¹⁴ Propaganda in the West goes so far that these proposals are a priori rejected as the impudence and arrogance of someone who submits to me and performs the function assigned to it by the West. Russia's intention is presented negatively as a cover-up manoeuvre to cover up its planned aggression.

¹⁵ The principle of inadmissibility or use of force in international relations, the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes, the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, the principle, including refraining from supporting organizations, groups and individuals promoting unconstitutional change of power and any action to change political or social regime. Principle of mutual respect and recognition of the other Party's security interests and concerns, support for the role of the UN Security Council in fulfilling its responsibility to maintain international peace and security. Confirmation of the fact that a nuclear war cannot have a winner. (MID, Preamble, 2021a)

do not own nuclear weapons on how to use such weapons. They will also not train general forces, nor will they train scenarios involving the use of nuclear weapons. Article 8 deals with the validity of the Treaty and language versions. (MID, 2021b)

2. *Agreement on security measures between the Russian Federation and the Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization* – Proposal: Reaffirming the desire to improve relations and strengthen mutual understanding, recognizing that current threats and challenges require joint efforts and that dangerous military activities must be prevented and thus reduced; recognizing that the security interests of both Parties call for multilateral cooperation, stability, predictability and transparency in the politico-military field, and reaffirming their commitment to the objectives and principles of the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the Founding Act of Russia-NATO Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security of 1997¹⁶, the 1994 Code of Conduct on Political-Military Aspects of Security, the 1999 European Security Charter (Istanbul Document) and the Rome Declaration *NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality - Heads of State and the governments of Russia and the Member States in NATO* in 2002, Russia and NATO are to agree to be guided in their relations by the principles of cooperation, equal and indivisible security; not to strengthen their security individually at the expense of the safety of others; to resolve disputes peacefully and to refrain from any threat or use of force; not to create conditions or situations that could pose or be perceived as a threat to the national security of other members; to maintain restraint in military planning and exercises, to reduce the risks of potentially dangerous situations by complying with obligations under international law, including those contained in intergovernmental agreements on the prevention of incidents at sea, outside territorial waters and in the airspace above them, as well as in intergovernmental agreements on the prevention of dangerous military operations and activities. (MID, Article 1, 2021c) In Article 2, the Parties commit to make use of urgent bilateral and multilateral consultation mechanisms, including the NATO-Russia Council, to resolve disputes and situations, and to exchange threat and challenge assessments on a regular and voluntary basis, as well as information on military exercises and manoeuvres and the basic provisions of military doctrines. To this end, all relevant confidence-building mechanisms and tools should be activated, including an emergency contact hotline. Article 3 can be considered very important for building mutual trust, as it requires the parties to confirm that they do not consider each other as opponents and that they will engage in dialogue and cooperation with each other in order to improve mechanisms for preventing incidents on the high seas and airspace above, particularly in the Baltic and Black Seas. It has become unacceptable to NATO and is considered arrogant by Article 4, according to which all Parties, including Russia, which were members of NATO on 27 May 1997, are to commit not to place their forces and armaments in the territory of any other European State, except those which were deployed in this territory before 27 May 1997. Should it be necessary to do so in order to neutralize the security threat, then they are allowed only with the consent of all parties¹⁷. Article 5 excludes the deployment of short- and medium-range missiles in areas from which they are able to hit targets in the territory of another member, and Article 6 obliges NATO not to expand further, including Ukraine and other states¹⁸. Article 7 obliges NATO not to undertake any military activities in Ukraine and other countries in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia. In order to prevent incidents, Russia and NATO should not conduct military exercises or other military activities beyond the brigade level in a zone of comparable breadth and order on both sides of the border line between Russia and the Allied States and between the NATO Members. Article 8 recognizes the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for the maintenance of peace and security, and Article 9 discusses the validity of the agreement, its archiving and language versions. (MID, 2021c)

With this initiative, Russia is also trying to keep what it has. According to its representatives, it will insist on legal agreements and written guarantees that exclude:

- 1) Further enlargement of NATO eastward into the countries of the former USSR, since, as Putin said, “*our Western partners have violated their oral commitments, ignored Russia's concerns and continue to do so*” (Interfax, 2022).
- 2) The deployment of offensive weapons systems in Europe, capable of hitting targets on Russian territory.
- 3) The expansion of NATO's infrastructure in the countries that joined the Alliance after 1997; in addition, the country will withdraw and NATO will start fulfilling its commitment from 1997, when it promised Russia that it

¹⁶ In May 1997, Russia and NATO signed the so-called The Founding Act, in which they reaffirmed that they "do not consider each other as adversaries" and provide a "mechanism for consultation, coordination and joint action". (Founding Act, 1997). The article refers to this act several times

¹⁷ This article therefore obliges NATO to withdraw its troops and bases from the territories of the countries that joined NATO after 1997, i.e. from the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

¹⁸ The article literally says that the parties “*undertake not to allow further NATO enlargement...*” (MID, Article 6, 2021c)

would increase its collective defence capabilities for new members by enhancing interoperability, not by increasing military capabilities in the region¹⁹.

“It is not we who are moving to NATO, but NATO is moving to us. Therefore, to say that Russia is behaving at least aggressively is not in line with common logic”, said **V. Putin** at a meeting with French President **E. Macron** in Moscow on February 7, 2022. (Interfax, 2022) A few days before this meeting the American news agency Bloomberg published the headline *“Russia invaded Ukraine”*, which hung on its website for 20 minutes and which deliberately deceived and misled²⁰. Bloomberg therefore published a fake report, the so-called hoax, which could very easily lead to open conflict. These days (from 11 February 2022) a report is circulating on social networks, which was seriously repeated by the State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic **M. Klus** that Russia will launch an attack on Ukraine on Wednesday, February 16, 2022. These obvious provocations that relieve tension do not help. In such an atmosphere, negotiating new security architecture in Europe seems practically impossible. Of course, Russia’s demands on NATO in December 2021 are finely exaggerated, as with any first negotiation step. The *collective West* is on the move, but its statements to date, as well as the spread of panic and war fears, are not conducive to such negotiations. At the same time, to calm the situation, it would be enough to guarantee the West that installations that could be a threat to Russia will not spread in Eastern Europe under the auspices of NATO.

II. Conclusion

In this context, it is necessary to perceive the imposition of the so-called Defence Cooperation Agreement between the USA and Slovakia (DCA). Slovakia represents the last pearl in the necklace of American military bases in Eastern Europe, moving around Russia. With it, the USA are creating a fore field of protection of its own territory, the so-called eye that attracts a possible attack. This means that in a possible conflict, Bratislava will be bombed instead of Washington, Warsaw instead of New York and Bucharest instead of another American city. At the same time, as a member of NATO, the US violated the 1997 agreement with Russia, which states that the new member states will increase their security through greater interoperability, not by increasing military capabilities²¹. (Founding Act, 1997) This is why Americans are placing their troops and facilities closer and closer to Russia’s borders through bilateral agreements, and that is why Russia is demanding a return to 1997.

Slovakia does not need this treaty for its defence, because NATO membership should provide it with sufficient guarantees (or should we perceive that those who signed it confirm what French President **E. Macron** once said about NATO, that NATO in fact is in a state of clinical death, and therefore we can no longer rely on

¹⁹ These include the withdrawal of foreign troops, equipment and armaments, and further steps aimed at returning to the 1997 configuration from countries that were not members of NATO at that date. This applies in particular to Romania, Bulgaria and Poland, where the US has built military bases. In Romania, they began to build bases as formally temporary, but off record US politicians also acknowledged that the US military would already be in the country forever. Subsequently, the US began building a missile base in the country, officially as a “missile shield” for Europe. Today, there are missile defence launchers. There are MK-41 launchers on which it is possible to install Tomahawks, which is, from Russia’s point of view, the most serious threat to its territory. They began to build similar ones in Poland, with thousands of American soldiers and a permanent presence. Four bases (less important) were also built in Bulgaria on the basis of a similar agreement on defence cooperation, which was ratified by Slovakia on February 8, 2022. All this, of course, is a cause for concern in Russia. In addition, the Russian leadership was also concerned about the changing political situation in Ukraine, which was clearly coordinated by the Americans – see instructions from US Secretary of State “Fuck EU” **V. Nuland** to Kiev, who can and cannot be in the new government, or directly Prime Minister.

²⁰ The agency subsequently withdrew the headline without explanation and later apologised, claiming that they were preparing *“headlines for various scenarios”* and that the mention of the alleged Russian aggression had been made public by mistake. Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman **M. Zacharova** criticized the US diplomacy department for keeping silent in this case and urged it to publish a report on all Bloomberg’s “fakes”, when US department had recently commented on the Russian news company RT, even though it had no evidence for its allegations. **Zacharova** said that *“there is more than enough facts about Bloomberg, but the state department is silent”*, and at the same time criticized the fact that Washington also financially supports the German channel Deutsche Welle, which is also financed from the German state budget. *“This speaks for itself – NATO’s propaganda machine is in full swing”*, she said. (Pravda, 2022)

²¹ The central theme of the agreement is, first and foremost, Russia’s concern about the transfer of nuclear weapons to its borders. The point at which NATO commits itself not to expand the location of nuclear capabilities in the new member states is the first and detailed commitment on the politico-military issue. (Founding Act, 1997)

his security guarantees as its member? Therefore, do we need a bilateral agreement with its dominant member? And where, then, has the European dimension and the European Union's common security and defence policy disappeared²²?) This treaty will not bring anything new to Slovakia, it is already basically radicalizing the domestic political scene, because it is clear to the people that a moderate attitude is losing and their views are being coughed. This treaty also trampled on the November 89 legacy and killed security guarantees in Europe.

Post scriptum

The war finally came to Europe, but not in the form reported by the mainstream media and secret services. It did not come physically, but emotionally. It opened a barrier of animal hatred, latently hidden in every European. Ethnicity became the main enemy. In the 1930s it was a Jew, today it is Russian and everything is coming from Russia. Emotional prejudices are institutionalized. Censorship. Reporting or denunciation. Scandalization. Ejecting from the job for political opinion. All of this accompanies Europeans today. A bureaucracy, creating and practicing decision-making procedures comes to the fore. A bureaucracy that governs state institutions and the mainstream media. A bureaucracy that feeds itself on the protection of the renewed archaic values of hatred that have seemingly disappeared in celebration of humanistic culture. And this bureaucracy will not allow that it will lose these new conquered territories. Most of the measures taken have a negative impact on the economy and social life in the European Union, they are even changing political systems and political and civil cultures, moving from a declared democracy to an open dictatorship. Fascism is creeping back into Europe.

Tons of weapons are pouring into Ukraine following the decision of the new EU member states from Eastern Europe, a new round of armaments is launched, most mainstream politicians and mainstream media together with their chosen experts and artists are jointly shifting publicly shared values to blindly call to arms, to celebrate the only one truth, to attack not against the war, not for peace, but against ethnicities. The hard-won traditions of humanism are being replaced by militant attitudes based on crowd behaviour and joyful competition in devotion to new flags and protectors...

The EU has lost its core and fundamental value - peace. EU watched the bombing of Yugoslavia and the tearing of international law into pieces during the partition of Serbia, watched and even participated in the aggressions against Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and Syria. For eight years, it overlooked the fascist Ukraine and its crimes as the genocide of the Russians in Donbas and Luhansk. Instead of calling for negotiations and ending the conflict, EU uses the language of sanctions and militarism instead of diplomacy. It has become an economic weapon of the dying NATO and the US foreign policy Chihuahua or hopscotch. For the United States, this is again one of the proxy wars, which, moreover, discredits, at least in the collective West, one of the reformers of the American-centric world order. And it's cheaper than the war in Afghanistan. **Henry Kissinger** put it this way: "...the development of the situation shows that the West has gone from a nebulous goal of integrating Russia into Western society in an effort to destroy it. On this issue, the US has lost its sense of proportion and context. By the way, Washington should address European security issues with Moscow". (Latta, 2015)

Politicians outside the EU sound like the voice of common sense today. Pope **Francis** (2022) said in the interview for Corriere della Sera that "maybe it was NATO barking at Russia's gate" that compelled Putin to unleash the invasion of Ukraine. "I have no way of telling whether his rage has been provoked...but I suspect it was maybe facilitated by the West's attitude". (Fontana, 2022) He said also that he didn't know whether other countries should supply Ukraine with more arms. „In Ukraine, it was other states that created the conflict,“, without identifying which states. He likened the war to other conflicts that he said were fomented by international interests: "Syria, Yemen, Iraq, one war after another in Africa." (Rocca-Gershkovich, 2022) Another example, Brazil leader **Lula da Silva** (2022) in the exclusive interview for Time stated: "Putin shouldn't have invaded Ukraine. But it's not just Putin who is guilty. The U.S. and the E.U. are also guilty. What was the reason for the Ukraine invasion? NATO? Then the U.S. and Europe should have said: "Ukraine won't join NATO." That would have solved the problem.... The conversations were very few. If you want peace, you have to have patience. They could have sat at a negotiating table for 10, 15, 20 days, a whole month, trying to find a solution. I think dialogue only works when it is taken seriously... And now, sometimes I sit and watch the President of Ukraine speaking on television, being applauded, getting a standing ovation by all the [European] parliamentarians. This guy is as responsible as Putin for the war. Because in the war, there's not just one person guilty... And now, this President of Ukraine could have said, "Come on; let's stop talking about this NATO business, about joining the E.U. for a while. Let's discuss a bit more first... I don't know the President of Ukraine. But his behavior is a bit weird. It seems like he's part of the spectacle. He is on television morning, noon, and night. He is in the U.K. parliament, the German parliament, the French parliament, the

²² For more details: IVANČÍK, R. 2021. Aktuálne výzvy Spoločnej bezpečnostnej a obrannej politiky Európskej únie. (Current challenges of the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union). *Almanac - Current Issues in World Economy and Politics*, 2021, vol. 16, no. 1, p. 5-19

Italian parliament, as if he were waging a political campaign. He should be at the negotiating table... If he didn't want war, he would have negotiated a little more. That's it. I criticized Putin when I was in Mexico City [in March], saying that it was a mistake to invade. But I don't think anyone is trying to help create peace. People are stimulating hate against Putin. That won't solve things! We need to reach an agreement. But people are encouraging [the war]. You are encouraging this guy [Zelensky], and then he thinks he is the cherry on your cake. We should be having a serious conversation: "OK, you were a nice comedian. But let us not make war for you to show up on TV." And we should say to Putin: "You have a lot of weapons, but you don't need to use them on Ukraine. Let's talk!" (Nugent, 2022)

The attack began on the morning of February 24, 2022; six days after Ukrainian President **Zelensky** begged collective West for the nuclear weapons at a Munich security conference to use them against Crimea, Donbas and Luhansk.

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