

The influence of demographic differences on the perception of persistence bribery activities in Abuja, Nigeria

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Abstract

The purpose of this study was to examine the influence of demographic differences on the perception of the persistence of bribery activities in Abuja, Nigeria. Prior studies focus more on how chronic and widespread bribery practices are in Nigeria, minimal attention was accorded to the link between demographic factors and continued occurrences of bribery activities in the country. This present study was anchored by the theory of social norms. The data for this study was generated via a survey questionnaire administered in Abuja, Nigeria. The responses totaling 846 were analyzed using multiple linear regressions method. The result indicated that age and educational differences significantly influenced perception on the persistence of bribery activities in Abuja, Nigeria. However, gender, marital status, family size, job status and annual income differences had an insignificant influence on the perception of persistence of bribery activities in Abuja, Nigeria. It was recommended that demographic differences of Nigerians should not be neglected when policies designed to tackle bribery activities are formulated.

Keywords: Bribery activities - demographic differences – influence – perception - persistence

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I. Introduction

Bribery activities are the most chronic and pervasive forms of unethical behaviors committed by different categories of people in all societies across the world. About one-fourth of the world population of different gender, age, income, and educational qualifications among other demographic factors are engaged in either offering, accepting, or giving bribes in their day-to-day activities (*Transparency International (TI), 2017*). More so, people and firms offer over one trillion US dollars in bribes in assessing goods and services supplied by private and public institutions in the world (*World Bank, 2017*).

Several attempts were made to link demographic factors like income, level of education, age, and gender with people's perception and involvement in bribery practices. For instance, several studies found that men have higher tendencies to offer and accept bribes when compared to women (*Breen, et al. 2017; Lan/Hong, 2017*). In terms of income differences, it was found that low-income earners are more vulnerable to bribery activities compared to the high-income earners (*Justesen/ Bjornskov 2014*). Educational differences also influence involvement in bribery activities, for instance, people that are highly educated are less likely to offer bribes to public officials for services, they are lawfully entitled to whereas, people that are lowly educated are more likely to offer bribes to public officials for services they are legally entitled to (*Peiffer/ Rose, 2014*).

Similarly, in developing countries, demographic differences featured among factors that causes people to commit bribery practices. Significant relationship exists between gender, age, income, educational differences and people's tolerance and justification of bribery activities in less developed countries (*Hernandez/McGee, 2014; Yu, et al. 2019*). However, a thorough search of the available literature to this present study reveals few attempts at investigating the influence of demographic differences of Nigerians on the perception of unethical behaviors in general and particularly bribery activities.

Nigeria a developing country in the western part of Africa has been dealing with prevalence of bribery activities committed by lowly and highly placed individuals in the country (*Sutherland, 2018*).

1.2 Statement of the problem

Bribery activities is a global issue affecting almost all societies. Its seriousness depends on the nature and behavior of the community. The prevalence bribery activities in Nigeria is a known fact. That every nine out of ten Nigerians are involved bribery activities based on the survey conducted by the *National Bureau of Statistics (NBS)* (2017).

The losses incurred due to bribery activities are enough to tackle infrastructural deficits in the power, transportation, telecommunications, educational and health sectors of the economy which would perhaps enable Nigeria to attain accelerated socio-economic growth and development (*Osibanjo, 2017*). More so, bribery activities have brought about negative perception of Nigeria in the eyes of foreign investors which served as a barrier in luring foreign investors into the country and perhaps the main reason why Nigeria is yet to attain its proper place among emerging and developing countries in the world (*Page, 2018; Benedict, 2019*).

Thus, the main concern of this present study is to examine whether demographic differences namely gender, age, marital status, family size, years of schooling (educational qualification), job status and annual income influence perceptions on continuous occurrences (persistence) of bribery activities in Abuja, Nigeria.

II. Theoretical Framework and Literature Review

2.1 Theoretical Framework

This present study was anchored by the theory of social norms postulated by *Perkins and Berkowitz* (1986). The theory states that the behavior of an individual is influenced by the ‘misperceptions’ of how other people think and behave. *Perkins and Berkowitz* (1986) initially employed the theory to explain issues related to student’s drinking of alcohol in high schools in the United States. The focus of the social norm’s theory is the role peer group influence plays towards shaping a person’s perceptions of a behavior.

Following the works of *Perkins and Berkowitz* (1986) several attempts were made to define what social norms are. According to *Ostrom* (2000: 143-144) social norms are “shared understandings about actions that are obligatory, permitted, or forbidden”. Social norms are divided into perceived descriptive and injunctive norms (*Bicchieri, 2016*). Perceived descriptive norms are people’s perceptions based on the behavior of others or what they consider to be a common practice in the society, whereas injunctive norms are people’s perceptions based on practices considered to be acceptable or unacceptable, approved or disapproved by other members in the society (*Tankard/Paluck, 2016; Köbis, Iragorri-Carter/Starke, 2018*).

Both perceived descriptive and injunctive social norms are being increasingly employed in explaining people’s perceptions towards unethical behaviors like bribery practices (*Köbis et al. 2015*). When applied to bribery practices descriptive and injunctive social norms can be described as informal rules that influence the perception of an individual towards such practices (*Köbis, Iragorri-Carter/Starke, 2018*). For instance, the prevalence and pervasiveness of corrupt practices in a society influenced the descriptive norms of a person’s decision to offer or accept a bribe (*Marquette/Peiffer, 2015; Köbis, Iragorri-Carter/Starke, 2018*). In the same vein, an individual decision to involve in bribery practices depends on anticipated gain to be derived from the practices and the bribing behavior of other individuals he/she associates with (*Köbis et al., 2019*). Similarly, in a laboratory experiment conducted by *Abbink et al., 2018*, it was found that there is a causal relationship between social norms and perception of bribery practices as well as people’s behavior towards the practices. The finding goes to show that the probability of a person’s decision to offer a bribe doubled when his/her pair is corrupt than when his/her pair is not corrupt.

In terms of injunctive norms, studies have shown that acceptability or non-acceptability of bribery activities significantly influenced a person’s perception of the activities in a country where he/she lives. In many countries in which ‘everybody does it’, injunctive norms influenced people’s perception of acceptability of acts of bribery (*Köbis et al., 2019*). *Persson, Rothstein and Teorell* (2013) also argues that in countries perceived to be corrupt in which ‘everyone is involved’ injunctive norms will influence people’s perception that acts like bribery are acceptable behavior. Similarly, *Singh* (2016) asserts that in countries where bribery activities are committed openly, injunctive norms will influence a person’s perception that the acts can be tolerated and justified.

Even though perceived descriptive and injunctive social norms appeared to be different, this present study proposed that the two can be employed to understand the influence of demographic differences on the perception of an unethical behavior like bribery in Abuja, Nigeria.

2.2 Review of Literature

In this section literature relevant to this study’s dependent variable (bribery activities) and the independent variables (gender, age, marital status, family size, educational qualification, job status and annual income) were reviewed.

2.2.1 Persistence of Bribery Activities

Bribery as an unethical behavior has been described in various ways by different scholars and organizations. At present the mostly used definition of bribery was provided by *TI* (2018) which has it that bribery is “the offering, promising, giving, accepting, or soliciting of an advantage as a stimulus for an action which is illegal, gross or a contravention of trust. Stimulations can take the form of gifts, loans, fees, rewards, or other advantages such as taxes, services, donations, and favors.

The focus of precious literature on acts of bribery were geared towards the prevalence of the acts in the world, minimal attentions is accorded for reasons of continuity of bribery activities despite various attempts to reduce the practices. In this section this present study focuses on studies that attempted to identify factors responsible for the occurrence of bribery activities across the globe. Studies conducted on micro factors responsible for occurrence of acts of bribery identified rational decisions that weighs damages and gains associated with involvement in bribery activities (*Guerrero/Rodríguez-Oreggia*, 2006), rent-seeking (*Ogbuagu, Ubi/Effiom*, 2014) and insufficient wages and salaries (*Singh*, 2016) as reasons why an individual may indulge in bribery practices.

At macro level *Peiffer* and *Rose* (2014) ascribed occurrences of bribery activities to the following factors: (i) conflicting social norms; (ii) socio-economic inequalities; (iii) social and political networks; (iv) social inclusion and exclusion and (v) institutional factors. Acts of bribery can also occur due to absence of economic freedom for the generality of the people, low human capital development and non-implementation of best global practices of anti-bribery measures (*Sanyal/Samanta*, 2017).

2.2.2 Demographic Factors and Bribery Activities

Previous studies reveal that there is an association between people’s demographic differences like age, gender, education and income and their participation and perceptions of bribery activities. For instance, *Ni* and *Su* (2019) found that societal and demographic factors are phenomenon that influence the manifestations of bribery activities around the globe.

Age differences have been used to explain involvement of people in the acts of bribery. For instance, many people indulged in the acts of bribery are within the middle-aged bracket (*Andresen/Button*, 2019). In the same vein, older people are less likely to indulge in the acts of bribery in that they less interact with corrupt officials (*Aboderin*, 2011). In contrast, no significant relationship exists between age differences and participation in the acts of bribery (*Duasa*, 2008).

On the relationship between gender differences and acts of bribery, previous studies arrived at mixed results. An early study conducted by *Swamy et al.* (2001) found that men’s involvement and tolerance of acts of bribery is higher compared to their female counterpart. This was corroborated by *Kevane* (2004) who avers that women’s involvement in the acts of bribery is less likely when compared to men particularly in developing countries. However, there instances in which women are more likely to indulge in the acts of bribery than men (*Armantier/Boly*, 2011). Yet, several studies found that gender differences do not influence people’s participations in the acts of bribery in that ‘everyone is involved’ (*Sung*, 2012; *Esarey/Chirillo*, 2013).

In terms of marital status and acts of bribery, a study by *Hernandez/McGee* (2013a) found that married people are more likely to tolerate bribery transactions while others not married are less likely to tolerate bribery transactions. Similarly, *Horodnic, Mazilu* and *Oprea* (2018) found that married individuals are likely to offer bribes when demanding healthcare services. However, a study by *Beekun, et. al.* (2017) asserts that married people opposed the offering of bribes more than singles.

On the relationship between people’s family size and acts bribery, few attempts were made to established whether the size of a person’s family influenced his/her participation in the acts. For instance, firms owned by large were found to be more involved acts of bribery than firms owned by small family (*Liu, et. al.* 2017; *Jeong/Siegel*, 2018).

Several studies have investigated the relationship between educational differences and involvement in bribery practices. A group of studies found that highly educated persons are more likely to be asked to offer bribes than people with lower levels of education because they are likely to come into more contact with public officials (*Rose/Peiffer*, 2016; *Zeng, Lee/Zhang*, 2016; *Ni/Su*, 2019). However, other studies found that people with lower levels of education are more likely to be involved in bribery practices than highly educated people (*Hernandez/McGee*, 2013b; *Benk, Yüzbaşı/McGee*, 2017).

Similarly, prior research studies on the relationship between a person’s job status and his participation in acts of bribery presented mixed findings. *Gordonichenko* and *Peter* (2007) were of the view that civil servant earnings and expenditures consist of both legal and “unobserved (unofficial) compensation (bribes)”. As such civil servants are more likely to accept bribes when compared to other occupations. However, *Hernandez* and *McGee* (2013b) found that civil servant opposes bribery more than salaried workers in the private sector. *Kubbe* (2018) argues that self-employed people's tolerance of bribery practices is high when compared to other categories of jobs.

In contrast to other demographic factors, majority of the available literature searched in this present study on the relationship between income and bribery acts support the fact that low-income earners tend to indulge in bribery activities more than other income groups (Fry, 2016; Kubbe, 2018; Muhtadi, 2019). However, earlier studies found that people earning high income are more prone to bribery practices because they have the means to bribe their way whenever they want something (Krishna, 2007; Mocan, 2008).

III. Material and Methods

Methods and Data

This study was conducted in Abuja, the federal capital territory of Nigeria. The selection of Abuja as the area of study was justified by its strategic location (center of Nigeria), size (667 square miles) and estimated population of 3,095,000 in 2019 (United Nations, 2021). Abuja provides opportunity for all kinds of bribery practices to be perpetrated, in that the city is a host to Nigerians from all works of life (low-income and high-income earners) and backgrounds (in terms of ethnic, religious, political affiliations among others). The target population of this study were junior and middle cadre civil servants, junior and middle tax collectors, junior and middle cadre workers in the private sector, road transport workers, petty traders, and informal entrepreneurs in Abuja.

The method used for this study was multi stage sampling involving the use of convenience sampling and simple random sampling in selecting sample or respondent from the targeted population. The instrument for data collection was questionnaire adopted from word Value Survey (WVS 2010 – 2014) and Transparency International (TI) global barometer (2017). The questionnaire was made on a 5-points likert scale ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree. It is expected that the instruments will be useful in discovering the perception of the targeted population about the persistence of bribery activities in Abuja, Nigeria. The instruments were closed-ended and mutually exclusive and the participants were made not to feel directly implicated in the questionnaire; this was done to allow the participants to voluntarily respond to the questions based on their experiences as suggested by Clausen, Kraay and Murrell (2010).

The items were designed to provide information such that all the variables in the study were addressed

IV. Empirical Analysis

4.1 Descriptive Statistics of the Participants

The demographic characteristics of the participants in this study are shown in table 1. The table shows that the gender of the participants is made up of 66.5% of male and 33.5% female. This shows that most of the participants were male. This is because about 70% of people who worked as civil servants, private sector workers and self-employed were male in Abuja, Nigeria. As indicated in table 1, the age of the participants exhibits that those within the range of 20 and below constituted 2.5%, 21 to 29 were 20.3%, 30 to 39 amounted to 35%, 40 to 49 were 29.8% while the remaining in the ages of 51 and above stood at 11.8%. This implies that majority of the participants (76.6%) were within the middle age bracket (30 to 51) and are those more likely to be vulnerable to bribery activities.

The marital status of the participants was also shown in table 1. The table displays that the participants who were married constituted 70.5%, whereas the remaining 29.5% were singles (including widows, divorcees and separated). Most of the participants were married in that in Abuja, Nigeria married people constitutes majority of those who supposed to earn income to cater for their family. Closely related to the marital status is the family size of the participants also depicted in table 1. The reveals respondents with a family size of 5 and below constituted 28.3%, while that with 6 to 10 formed 33.9%, 11 to 15 have a family size of 21.4% and those with 16 and above composed of 16.4%. This is an indication that most of the participants (62.2%) have a family size ranging from 1 to 10. It is likely that the people with large family size are more likely to be exposed to bribery practices.

The educational qualifications attained by the participants was also displayed in table 1. The table reveals that 0.7% of the participants had not attained a formal education (0 years of schooling), 0.8% acquired primary school certificates (6 years of schooling), 2.6% obtained school certificates (12 years of schooling), 24.6% were holders of diploma/NCE (14 years of schooling), 53.5% acquired degree/HND certificates (16 years of schooling), and 15.9% possessed master's degree (18 years of schooling) while 1.8% were having PhD degrees (20 years of schooling). This shows that most of the participants (71.2%) attained higher educational qualifications (degree/HND, master and PhD). This is likely in that as a cosmopolitan city, Abuja witnessed an influx of highly educate individuals searching for employments opportunities in the private and public sector possessed a higher qualification (see the job status of the participants). The educational qualification obtained by a person can influence how he/she will perceive an unethical behavior like bribery.

Table 1 also depicts the job/employment status of the participants. The table shows that 22.6% worked as salaried workers in the private sector 64.2% worked as civil/public servants and 13.2% were into self-employment (consisting of Farmers, petty traders, drivers, carpenters, market women, spare parts dealers, food

vendors and welders). The civil servants constituted the majority of those whom the questionnaires were administered in that they are readily available. Furthermore, civil servants are more susceptible to bribery practices in Nigeria. The employment status was captured in that it is likely that people engaged in productive activities are those who faced bribery activities the most in Nigeria.

Table 1 also captures the annual income of the participants. The table shows that 12.9% received an annual income of \$685 and below, 5.0% received \$686 to \$959, those who received \$960 to \$1,233 were 10.4%, 10.8% earned an annual income between \$1,234 to \$1507 and 60.9% earned \$1,508 and above as their annual income. This goes to show that the participants are recipients of either low or middle-income (target population for this study). The responses also further reveal that Nigeria is a lower-middle-income country (World Bank, 2019). The annual income of the respondents is likely to influence their perceptions of bribery activities in Abuja, Nigeria.

Table 1
Demographic Characteristics of the Respondents

Variables	Frequency	Percentage
Gender		
Male	556	66.5
Female	280	33.5
Age		
20 and Below	23	2.8
21- 29	170	20.3
30 -39	295	35.3
40 -49	249	29.8
50 and Above	99	11.8
Marital Status		
Single	247	29.5
Married	589	70.5.
Family Size		
5 and Below	237	28.3
6 – 10	283	33.9
11 – 15	179	21.4
Table 1 continued		
16 and Above	137	16.4
Educational Qualification		
No Formal Education	6	.7
Primary Certificate	7	.8
Secondary Certificate	22	2.6
Diploma/NCE	206	24.6
Degree/HND	447	53.5
Master	133	15.9
PhD	15	1.8
Job Status		
Salaried Worker in the Private Sector	189	22.6
Civil Servant	537	64.2
Self-employed (Farmers 9, petty traders 13, drivers 11, carpentry 7, market women 9, spare parts dealers 21, food vendors 36 and welders 4)	110	13.2
Annual Income		
₦250, 000 (\$685) and Below	108	12.9
₦251, 000 – ₦350, 000 (\$686 - \$959)	42	5.0
Table 4.7 continued		
₦351, 000 – ₦450, 000 (\$960 - \$1,233)	87	10.4

₦451, 000 – ₦550, 000 (\$1234 - \$1,507)	90	10.8
₦551, 000 (\$1,508) and Above	509	60.9

Source: Field survey 2019 (questionnaire survey administered to the participants in Abuja, Nigeria by the authors)

4.2 Empirical Model

As stated earlier, multiple linear regression was employed to the achieve the objective of this present study. In this section the multiple linear regression model (MLRM) is specified. Following *Wooldridge* (2015) the multiple linear regression model can be expressed as follow:

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1X_1 + \beta_2X_2 + \beta_3X_3 + \dots\beta_kX_k + \varepsilon \quad [1]$$

Where:

Y = the dependent variable

β_0 = the constant or intercept representing the predicted value of Y for sample with scores of all X's = 0

$X_1, X_2, X_3 \dots, X_k$, = the explanatory variables

$\beta_0, \beta_1, \beta_2, \beta_3 \dots, \beta_k$ = the parameters associated with the explanatory variables to be estimated

ε = the error term or disturbance representing other factors than the explanatory variables that may affect the dependent variable.

In a multiple regression model, the coefficient (β) of an explanatory variable signifies how the dependent variable changes when the explanatory variable changes by one unit, holding other explanatory variables in the model constant.

When the multiple regression equation [1] is applied to this study's dependent and explanatory variables the estimable equation can be expressed as follow:

$$PBR_i = \beta_{0i} + \beta_4GND_i + \beta_5AGE_i + \beta_6MTS_i + \beta_7FAS_i + \beta_8JOB_i + \beta_9ANY_i + \varepsilon_i \quad [2]$$

Where:

PBR_i = Persistence of bribery practices

GND_i = Gender of the respondent

AGE_i = Age of the respondent

MTS_i = Marital status of the respondent

FAS_i = Family size of the respondent

EDU_i = Educational qualification of the respondent

JOB_i = Job status of the respondent

ANY_i = Annual income of the respondent

4.3 Estimated Model Coefficients

In this subsection, the outcomes of the estimated coefficients of the effects of the explanatory variables on persistence of bribery activities in Abuja, Nigeria are presented in table 2. The table provides the unstandardised coefficients, t-statistics and p- values of the constant and that of the explanatory variables.

Table 2
Multiple regression model coefficients

Variables	Unstandardised Coefficients B	Std. Error	t	Sig (p-value)
Constant	3.782	0.177	21.388	0.000***
GND	0.027	0.057	0.478	0.632
AGE	-0.094	0.032	-2.950	0.003***
MTS	0.066	0.068	0.975	0.330
FAS	0.021	0.026	0.829	0.407
EDU	0.020	0.010	1.927	0.054*
JOB	-0.106	0.067	-1.583	0.114
ANY	-0.017	0.022	-0.765	0.444

Source: Author's computation

Note: Persistence of bribery activities (PBR) is the dependent variable. The explanatory variables are: gender of the respondent (GND a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if it is male and 0 otherwise); age of the respondent (AGE); marital status of the respondent (MTS a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if it is married and 0 otherwise); family size of the respondent (FAS); educational qualification of the respondent (EDU); job status of the respondent (JOB a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if it is civil servant and 0 otherwise) and annual income of the respondent (ANY). The unstandardised coefficient (B) shows how PBR

varies with an explanatory variable when other explanatory variables are held constant. Standard error (Std error). T-statistics (t) is B divided by Std. Error. The T-statistics measures how precisely B is measured by telling whether variation between groups is significant. Significance level (p-value) *** represents statistical significance at 1% and * represents statistical significance at 10%.

Statistical Significance Test

A test of statistical significance was conducted to determine whether the regression model is a good fit for the data used in this present study. The test was conducted using analysis of variance (ANOVA). The ANOVA test is used to ascertain whether the outcome of a survey is significant by assessing if the means of two or more categories are statistically significantly different from each other (Miller, 1997; Scheffe, 1999). A statistically significant result will indicate that the model is good fit for the data, an insignificant result will indicate otherwise. The outcome of the test is presented in table 3. The table provides residual, degree of freedom, sum of squares, mean square, F-statistics, and p-value.

Table 3
Statistical significance test (ANOVA)

Model	Sum of Square	DF	Mean Square	F	Sig (p-value)
Regression	12.549		7	1.793	3.077
Residual	482.373	828	0.583		0.003***
Total	494.923	835			

Source: Author's computation

Note: Residual is the difference between actual or observed value of the outcome (dependent) variable and predicted value. Degree of freedom (DF) deals with pieces of information used in estimating the model. The total DF shows the number of observations used in the ANOVA. Sums of squares measures the quantity of variation in the data used accounted by each variable in the model. Mean square is identical to sums of squares. It is calculated by dividing sums of squares by DF. F-statistics or F-ratio (F) tells whether the regression model gives a better fit to the data used in this study over a model that does contain the explanatory variables. P-value (Sig) *** represents statistical significance at 1%. Dependent: Persistence of Bribery Activities, Explanatory: (Constant), Gender of the Participants, Age of the Participants, Marital Status of the Participants, Family Size of the Participants, Educational Qualification of the Participants, Job Status of the Participants and Annual Income of the Participants.

An inspection of table 3 reveals that the model as whole is statistically significant. This is indicated by F (7,828) = 3.077 with the corresponding p-value of 0.003. In other words, the explanatory variables statistically significantly predict PBR in Nigeria. Therefore, the regression model is a good fit for the data used in this study present.

V. Discussion of the Findings

Table 2 shows that GND recorded a positive unstandardised coefficient (0.027); this indicates that GND differences influenced the perception of PBR in Abuja, Nigeria. The coefficient implies that if the participant is a male, he is likely to agree more than a female participant that there is PBR in Abuja, Nigeria. Accordingly, the coefficient shows that being a male participant, agreeing on PBR tends to increase by 2.7 percentage points when other independent variables in the model are held constant. This goes to show that there is positive relationship between PBR and GND. However, the p-value indicates that the variable is statistically insignificant (0.632). This outcome coincides with the findings of several studies that found that men are more involved in bribery activities than women in that men constitutes the large number of individuals that interact with corrupt public personnel when assessing public goods supplied by the public authorities (Houensou/Saliga, 2019; Kubbe, Alexander/Wängnerud, 2019; Ni/Su, 2019). The outcome of the estimated coefficient for GND perception on PBR using multiple regression in this study appears to be the pioneer in the field of bribery activities in Nigeria as the available literature reviewed did not reveal a study that employs the method in examining the influence of gender on bribery activities in the Nigerian context.

Table 2 also reveals that AGE recorded a negative unstandardised coefficient (-0.094). This indicates that for each one-year increase in the age of the participant, there is a decrease in perception on PBR by 9.4 percentage point holding other independent variables in the model constant. The coefficient shows that the relationship between AGE and perception about PBR is negative. In other words, young and middle-aged respondents are likely to agree on PBR relative to the elderly. Interestingly, AGE reported statistically positive significant value (0.003) at 1%. This outcome implies that AGD has a strong influence on perceiving PBR in Abuja, Nigeria. This finding buttresses the outcome of a survey conducted by *United Nations Office on Drugs*

and Crime (UNODC) (2017) in Nigeria which finds that young individuals within the ages of 25 to 34 are more exposed to bribery activities more than other age groups. Similarly, younger persons are more likely to participate in bribery activities compared to other age brackets (Fry, 2018; Zakaria, 2018). Thus, the influence of AGD differences in bribery activities should not be neglected by anti-bribery institutions in Nigeria.

Evidence from Table 2 reveals that MTS has a positive unstandardised coefficient (0.066) indicating that married persons are likely to agree on PBR more than the reference group (single). Similarly, the coefficient shows that being married increases the probability of agreeing on PBR by 6.6 percentage points assuming other independent variables included in the model are held constant. This outcome suggests that there is a positive relationship between MTS and perception on PBR. The p-value of MTS (0.330) indicates that there is no statistical significance of marital status in the model. In other words, MTS plays a weak role in influencing the perception of PBR in Abuja, Nigeria. This result confirms the findings of some studies who affirmed that the relationship between MTS of people and involvement in bribery activities is not yet established (Zonebia, Yusuf/Heriyaldi, 2019; Mavisakalyan, Otrachshenko/Popova, 2021).

An examination of Table 22 indicates that FAS recorded a positive unstandardised coefficient (0.021); this shows that a positive relationship exists between FAS and perception on PBR in Abuja, Nigeria. The coefficient also shows that for each one unit increase in FAS, holding other independent variables constant, the probability of a respondent to agree on PBR increases by 2.1%. This implies the likelihood of participants with smaller and medium FAS to disagree on PBR compared with those with large family size (16 and above). This finding supports the outcome of studies conducted by Page (2018) and Kuvvet (2019) who argues that individuals with large family sizes are more likely to indulge in bribery activities as a means of supporting their families; as such they are likely to perceive PBR. Statistically FAS is insignificant (0.407); implying the variable does not have a strong influence in explaining PBR in Abuja, Nigeria.

In contrast, to FAS, table 2 reveals that EDU is statistically significant (0.054) at 10%; implying that the factor strongly influences perception on PBR in Nigeria. The table also shows that EDU recorded a positive unstandardised coefficient (0.020). This implies that for every one-year increase in schooling, holding the other independent variables in the model constant, agreeing on PBR is likely to increase by 2.0 percentage points. The implication of this finding is that participants that are highly educated are more likely to agree on PBR in Abuja, Nigeria compared to participants with lower levels of education. This finding is similar to the findings of several studies who found that people who attained higher levels of education are more likely to tolerate and justify bribery activities compared to people with lower levels of education (Mocan, 2008; Melgar, Rossi/Smith, 2010). In contrast, a group of studies found that highly educated people are less likely to tolerate or justify bribery activities (Hernandez/McGee, 2013b; Benk, Yüzbaşı/McGee, 2017). The statistical significance of EDU (0.054) indicates that the variable is an influential determinant of perception on PBR in Abuja, Nigeria.

An inspection of table 2 shows that JOB recorded a negative unstandardised coefficient (-0.106); this implies that if the participant was a civil servant the likelihood of agreeing on PBR decreases by 10.6 percentage points when other explanatory variables in the model are held constant. This is an indication that salaried workers in the private sector and self-employed perceived the presence of PBR in Nigeria compared to civil servants. Furthermore, the result indicates that there is an inverse relationship between JOB and perception on PBR in Abuja, Nigeria. JOB is statistically insignificant (0.114); implying that JOB has a weak influence in perceiving PBR in Nigeria. The outcome of the estimation for JOB corroborates with the findings of Hernandez and McGee (2014) who found that self-employed individuals tend to tolerate and justify bribery practices relative to other categories of workers. In another study, Hernandez and McGee (2013b) found that full-time employees (salaried employment in the private sector and civil servant) tolerate and justifies bribery more than self-employed individuals.

Table 2 also depicts the estimated unstandardised coefficient of ANY. The table shows that ANY recorded a negative coefficient (-0.017); indicating that the relationship between ANY and perception on PBR in Abuja, Nigeria is negative. In addition, the table reveals that for each one unit increase in ANY, there is a decrease in perception on PBR of 1.7 percentage points when other explanatory variables in the model are held constant. This means that high income earners tend to disagree about PBR compared to low- and middle-income earners. In other words, low-income earners are more likely to agree on PBR in Abuja, Nigeria compared to middle-income earners. However, ANY is statistically insignificant (0.444) in the model; this implies that ANY has a weak influence on PBR. This finding is in line with several studies who found that low-income earners (poor) are more likely to frequently encounter bribery incidences than middle and high-income earners (Hernandez/McGee, 2014; Justesen/Bjørnskov, 2014; Mbate, 2018). However, other studies found that the rich are more likely to interact with government officials more frequently than the poor and consequently are more likely to tolerate and justify bribery practices (Mocan, 2008; Hunt/Laszlo, 2012).

In a nutshell the findings of this present study indicates that some demographic differences do influence perceptions on bribery activities in Abuja, Nigeria. It is therefore recommended that such differences should be considered when policy measures aimed at reducing bribery activities are formulated by the authorities in Nigeria.

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